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INTRODUCTION 
When courts seek to determine a website user’s privacy expectations and 
the website’s promises to that user, they almost invariably look to the terms 
of use agreement or to the privacy policy.1  Courts rarely look to the 
                                                          
*      Assistant Professor, Cumberland School of Law at Samford University; Affiliate 
Junior Scholar, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School.  The author would 
like to thank Daniel Solove, William McGeveran, Chris Hoofnagle, Ryan Calo, Cathy 
Packer, Anne Klinefelter, Nancy Kim, Jen King, Fred Stutzman, Dean Smith, Jennifer 
Hartzog, Danielle Citron, Marcia Hofmann, Will DeVries, Lauren Willis, Jennifer Urban, 
Deven Desai, the Cumberland School of Law faculty, the participants of the Third Annual 
Privacy Law Scholars Conference, and the participants of Samuelson Law, Technology & 
Public Policy Clinic’s Privacy Scholars Speakers Series. 
 1. E.g., McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 95–96 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (looking to the 
privacy policy and terms of service to find that a blog created an expectation of privacy for 
its users); Sedersten v. Taylor, No. 09-3031-CV-S-GAF, 2009 WL 4802567, at *1, *3 
(W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009) (finding a website privacy policy does not waive a user’s right to 
anonymous free speech); In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 
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privacy settings or other elements of a website where users specify their 
privacy preferences because these settings and elements are typically not 
considered part of any contract or promise to the user.2  Yet studies have 
shown that few users actually read or rely upon terms of service or privacy 
policies.3  In contrast, users regularly take advantage of and rely upon 
privacy settings.4 
Consider Facebook.  The social networking site has a Terms of Use 
Agreement with a section titled “privacy.”5  The agreement references 
Facebook’s privacy policy, a separate document.6  Many users, however, 
do not rely on these documents when establishing the privacy they expect 
when using Facebook.7  When a user sets up a Facebook profile, the user 
can set a series of privacy settings that allow the user to control how widely 
accessible the profile is.8  The user’s profile can be viewed by friends 
only—those people explicitly invited to see the profile—or by “friends of 
                                                          
325 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (examining an airline’s privacy policy to determine whether plaintiffs 
had a claim for reliance); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 
2004) (finding that plaintiffs failed to allege that they read, understood or relied upon the 
privacy policy and thus failed to allege contractual damages); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy 
Litig., No. 04-126(PAM/JSM), 2004 WL 1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) (holding 
that the privacy statement did not constitute a unilateral contract and that plaintiff must have 
read the policy to rely on it). 
 2. See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing courts’ treatment of privacy settings and elements 
in determining the existence of a contract); see also infra Part II.A.4 (proposing the use of 
website design as a contract and discussing the accompanying issues). 
 3. TABREEZ GOVANI & HARRIET PASHLEY, STUDENT AWARENESS OF THE PRIVACY 
IMPLICATIONS WHEN USING FACEBOOK pt. 5.3 (2005), http://lorrie.cranor.org/courses/fa05/ 
tubzhlp.pdf (finding that 80% of the users surveyed for the study had not read the Facebook 
Privacy Policy); Andy Greenberg, Who Reads the Fine Print Online?  Less Than One 
Person in 1000, FORBES (Apr. 8 2010, 3:15 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/firewall/ 
2010/04/08/who-reads-the-fine-print-online-less-than-one-person-in-1000/ (noting that 
studies have found that only 0.11% of users will view a site’s terms of service by clicking 
on a link). 
 4. MARY MADDEN & AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, REPUTATION 
MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL MEDIA:  HOW PEOPLE MONITOR THEIR IDENTITY AND SEARCH 
FOR OTHERS ONLINE 2 (2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Reputation-
Management.aspx (finding that “71% of social networking users ages 18–29 have changed 
the privacy settings on their profile to limit what they share with others online”). 
 5. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ 
terms.php?ref=pf (last revised Apr. 26, 2011) (stating, in the first term of the agreement, that 
“[y]our privacy is very important to us” and referring users to the website privacy policy). 
 6. See id. (directing users to click a link to view the privacy policy); Facebook’s 
Privacy Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last revised Dec. 22, 
2010) (informing users of how the website uses and shares users’ information, along with 
extensive other terms). 
 7. See JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., THE FTC AND CONSUMER PRIVACY IN THE COMING 
DECADE 2, 12 (FTC Tech-ade Workshop 2006), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/ 
FTC_Consumer_Privacy.pdf (finding that only 1.4% of study participants reported reading 
the terms of standard-form electronic agreements often and thoroughly, 66.2% rarely read or 
browse these agreements, and 7.7% stated that they have never noticed or read them). 
 8. See Controlling How You Share, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/privacy/ 
Explanation (last visited Aug. 9, 2011) (enabling users to control, via customization, the 
accessibility of their Facebook profile). 
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friends,” which expands the exposure much further, to anyone linked to the 
user’s friends.9  If the user wants to expose personal information to all 
Facebook users, the profile can be set to be public.10  The user can also 
specify whether the profile appears in Internet search results.11 
 
Figure 1:   
Screenshot of Facebook’s Privacy Settings (June 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These settings, more than the vague, verbose, and often unread terms of 
service and privacy policy, are usually determinative of a user’s privacy 
                                                          
 9. See id. (describing the different sharing options, including sharing information with 
“Everyone,” “Friends of Friends,” and “Friends Only”). 
 10. See id. (noting that the information that users do not protect, meaning 
“[i]nformation available to everyone,” is viewable by anyone on the Internet).  The fact that 
a profile is “public” can have significant legal consequences.  See Moreno v. Hanford 
Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858, 861 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting that “once posted on 
myspace.com,” Moreno’s posting was “available to anyone with internet access”).  In 
Moreno, the court held that a woman who posted a poem to her public profile on the social 
network site MySpace had no reasonable expectation of privacy because she “publicized her 
opinions . . . [on] a hugely popular internet site.  [Moreno’s] affirmative act made her article 
available to any person with a computer and thus opened it to the public eye.”  Id. at 862. 
 11. See Controlling How You Share, supra note 8 (noting that the “[p]ublic search” 
option “controls whether things [users have] specifically chosen to share with everyone 
show up in searches” on the Internet). 
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expectations when using Facebook.  A user relies on these settings.12  
Indeed, without the ability to set a profile to be viewable only by friends, a 
user might not sign up to use Facebook at all, or would reveal far less 
intimate information in the online profile.13  Should the privacy settings be 
considered part of the agreement between the user and Facebook?  In an 
age where website interactivity is the hallmark of many sites, courts must 
re-think what constitutes an online agreement. 
This Article proposes that website features and design should, in some 
contexts, be considered enforceable promises.  Code-based negotiations for 
confidentiality can form implied-in-fact contracts or give rise to a claim for 
promissory estoppel.14  The so-called “Web 2.0”15 has provided individuals 
with a greater ability to negotiate terms regarding their own privacy by 
accepting offers to delete personal information, remove identifying tags, 
and use privacy settings—online activities that clearly indicate a user’s 
desire to control the flow of her personal information.16  Yet courts often 
fail to recognize these code-based promises, instead considering them little 
more than luxuries offered by websites.17  This is the case even though 
these features are often couched in a contractual setting.18   
Doctors, lawyers, financial professionals, priests, and even intimate 
partners regularly make implicit promises to respect the privacy of others 
based upon the context of their relationship.19  Yet on the Web, courts seem 
                                                          
 12. See Complaint at 2, 12, Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00366-RSL 
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 2, 2011) (describing users’ use of privacy settings, and alleging that 
Amazon circumvented the settings established by users); Complaint at 2, 7, Ferguson v. 
Classmates Online, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-00365-RAJ (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2010) (alleging a 
claim for, among others, breach of contract for failing to keep confidential information 
protected by privacy settings). 
 13. See, e.g., MADDEN & SMITH, supra note 4, at 2 (noting that the majority of social 
network site users have utilized privacy settings to limit what they share online). 
 14. See, e.g., McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 96 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (finding that “the 
terms of service of the blog create an expectation of privacy for any registered user”); 
Complaint at 23–24, Del Vecchio, No. 2:2011-cv-00366-RSL (alleging that Amazon’s 
privacy policy and privacy notice constituted promises to users that their privacy settings 
would function as users’ expected). 
 15. See Tim O’Reilly, What Is Web 2.0:  Design Patterns and Business Models for the 
Next Generation of Software, O’REILLY NETWORK (Sept. 30, 2005), 
http://oreilly.com/web2/archive/what-is-web-20.html (describing the meaning of the term 
“Web 2.0”). 
 16. See Controlling How You Share, supra note 8 (noting that Facebook users can 
control what parts of their profile and corresponding information are viewable, and to 
whom). 
 17. See, e.g., Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004) 
(looking only to the privacy policy itself, as opposed to code-based promises, to determine 
whether a breach of contract related to privacy had occurred); see also infra Part II.A.1 
(describing types of “code-based promises,” such as padlock images on websites). 
 18. See Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and “Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 
50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1341 (2009) (noting that even where websites “create the illusion of 
limited publication and control,” there is no way for users to utilize that control nor is there 
any law that recognizes those user decisions); Controlling How You Share, supra note 8. 
 19. See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell:  Protecting Intimate Relationship 
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to recognize only boilerplate terms of use when analyzing contractual 
agreements.20  The central thesis of this Article is that by primarily relying 
on standard-form terms to analyze online agreements, courts risk ignoring 
the full agreement between the parties.  This approach has inhibited 
contract-based solutions to protect the flow of personal information.  The 
advent of highly interactive website design compels a re-examination of the 
contractual relationship between websites and their users.  No area is in 
greater need of increased scrutiny than user privacy. 
This Article introduces a new theory into contract doctrine and the 
surprisingly-neglected intersection of online agreements and 
confidentiality.  This Article contains three proposals to refocus the law 
away from standard-form doctrine to an approach that more accurately 
reflects the agreements between websites and users.  First, to the extent 
website design is incorporated into, or is consistent with, a website’s terms 
of use, or to the extent website design induces reliance, courts should 
consider these design features enforceable promises.  Second, courts should 
expand their analysis of unconscionability to include consideration of 
malicious interfaces that manipulate, exploit, or attack users in areas of a 
website beyond the terms of use.  Third, website design should be seen as a 
subsequent agreement, or “operational reality,” between the parties.  This 
Article concludes by proposing that a more nuanced analysis of online 
agreements is necessary when highly interactive websites implicate an 
individual’s privacy.  While online agreements can threaten an individual’s 
privacy, the extension of contract doctrine to website design represents an 
opportunity for users to regain at least some control over the flow of 
personal information. 
I. CHOKING ON FORM CONTRACTS 
Courts often ignore website design and interactive features as implicit 
and explicit aspects of the agreement between the website and the user.  
This is a significant omission, since the only other contractual terms on 
virtually every website are standard-form.21  This section will review the 
doctrine surrounding online contracts and caution against ignoring much of 
                                                          
Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 913 (2006) 
(observing that “[c]onfidential relationships are recognized by the law in a variety of 
contexts, including familial, friendship, and business relationships” and that each 
relationship contains an “implicit promise of confidentiality” characterized by reasonable 
expectations, customs, and reliance). 
 20. See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV 429, 434 (2002) (stating that the principal legal issue in 
interpreting both paper and virtual contracts is the effect that should be given to boilerplate 
terms).   
 21. See id. at 429 (recognizing the proliferation of boilerplate language in agreements 
on websites). 
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the website-user relationship by relying solely on the text in terms of use 
and privacy policies. 
A primary function of the Internet is connecting people.  These 
connections can create a privity of contract between websites and users.22  
Contracts between websites and users are typically found in the form of 
terms of use.23  With online agreements on a number of websites, the 74% 
of Americans online each day24 may enter into dozens of contracts that 
impact the flow of their personal information.  These agreements are 
adjudicated under standard-form contract doctrine because they are 
perceived as non-negotiable.25  This means users are regularly bound by 
terms they did not read or understand—a common critique of all standard-
form contracts.26 
Much, if not all, online communication falls within the ambit of a 
website’s terms of use or privacy policy.  Behavioral restrictions regulate 
users’ interactions with other users.  Privacy policies dictate how personal 
information and browsing activity will be stored and used.27  Terms of use 
disclaim liability for a large swath of website activity and inaccuracies.28  
These terms are purportedly contracts; moreover, these contracts are found 
on virtually every website on the Internet.29 
Before the Internet, most standard-form contracts, which were largely 
adhesive in nature, were typically used in high-volume consumer sales 
transactions.30  These contracts enabled mass commerce because they 
                                                          
 22. Privity is defined as “[t]he connection or relationship between two parties, each 
having a legally recognized interest in the same subject matter.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1320 (9th ed. 2009). 
 23. See Molnar v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., No. CV 08-0542 CAS (JCx), 2008 WL 
4772125, at *2, *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (looking to a website’s “Terms of Use” to find 
a contract between the defendant website and the plaintiff, a website user). 
 24. 74%—America Online, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, 
http://pewresearch.org/databank/dailynumber/?NumberID=948 (last visited June 3, 2011). 
 25. See Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., No. 4:07cv1963 CDP, 2009 WL 586513, at *2 (E.D. 
Mo. Mar. 6, 2009) (providing that “[a] customer on notice of contract terms available on the 
internet is bound by those terms,” just as with any binding contract). 
 26. Id.; see also Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion:  An Essay in Reconstruction, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1179 (1983) (noting that with contracts of adhesion, such as 
standard-form contracts, “the adhering party is in practice unlikely to have read the standard 
terms before signing the document and is unlikely to have understood them if he has read 
them”). 
 27. See, e.g., Facebook’s Privacy Policy, supra note 6. 
 28. See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 460 (2006) (indicating 
that terms of use “control (or purport to control) the circumstances under which buyers of 
software or visitors to a public Web site can make use of that software or site”). 
 29. See, e.g., David Mirchin, Terms of Use: The Rules Have Changed, INFO. TODAY, 
Oct. 2007, at 1 (“Virtually every commercial and noncommercial Web site has Web site 
‘Terms and Conditions,’ or Terms of Use.”). 
 30. See NANCY S. KIM, ‘WRAP CONTRACTS AND PRIVACY 1 (Association for the 
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Press Technical Report SS-10-05, 2010), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1580111 (observing that “as mass 
market sales became possible with industrialization, so did mass consumer form contracts” 
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managed risk well and lowered the cost of transactions.31  Websites created 
a new venue for standard-form contracts in the form of terms of use.  Site 
administrators use them to limit liability through traditional means—such 
as arbitration clauses and disclaimers of warranties—while maximizing the 
benefit of user participation by restricting user behaviors and remedies and 
requiring a relinquishment of rights, including certain privacy and 
intellectual property interests.32  As websites became ubiquitous, so did 
terms of use.  As a result, an overwhelming amount of online activity is not 
governed by default law but rather through agreement between the 
parties.33 
The omnipresence of standard-form contracts can be troubling.  
According to the great scholar Friedrich Kessler, standard-form contracts 
allow businesses “to legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner 
without using the appearance of authoritarian forms.”34  Kessler found that 
this power “enabl[es] [businesses] to impose a new feudal order of their 
own making upon a vast host of vassals.”35  This “orgy of contract 
formation”36 has significant consequences for information privacy.  To 
properly frame the contractual significance of code-based promises in 
privacy disputes, a brief review of online contract doctrine is in order. 
                                                          
because it was generally easier “to create standard terms for standard business transactions” 
where communication with individual customers was impracticable). 
 31. See Rakoff, supra note 26, at 1230 (noting that contracts of adhesion, such as 
standard-form contracts, create cost savings and lower prices that result from placing the 
risk on the consumer or adherent). 
 32. JOSEPH BONNEAU & SÖREN PREIBUSCH, THE PRIVACY JUNGLE:  ON THE MARKET FOR 
DATA PROTECTION IN SOCIAL NETWORKS 24 (The Eighth Workshop on the Economics of 
Information Society 2009), http://preibusch.de/publications/Bonneau_Preibusch__Privacy_ 
Jungle__2009-05-26.pdf (concluding that the authors’ study of various website privacy 
policies revealed “few meaningful rights [were] assigned to users,” while website operators 
“reserved many data collection and sharing rights for themselves”); Sandra Braman & 
Stephanie Roberts, Advantage ISP:  Terms of Service as Media Law, 5 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 
422, 438 (2003) (discussing the ways that Internet Service Providers limit their own 
liability, while also infringing on user rights). 
 33. See Braman & Roberts, supra note 32, at 423 (noting that subscribers or users of 
Internet Service Providers do so on the basis of a contractual agreement with the provider). 
 34. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943). 
 35. Id. 
 36. This phrase was borrowed from Guido Calabresi in his 1982 book Common Law for 
the Age of Statutes.  Calabresi stated, “The last fifty to eighty years have seen a fundamental 
change in American law.  In this time we have gone from a legal system dominated by the 
common law, divined by courts, to one in which statutes, enacted by legislatures, have 
become the primary source of law.”  GUIDO CALABRESI, COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF 
STATUTES 1 (1982).  Calabresi himself borrowed the phrase from Grant Gilmore when he 
argued that this “orgy of statute making” had significant consequences for American 
jurisprudence.  The current “Age of Contracts” similarly threatens to alter the dominant 
form of law governing individuals online.  
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A. A Brief Review of “Wraps” 
It has become a truism that virtually no one reads standard-form online 
agreements.  A recent study found that less than one in 1000 e-commerce 
website users read the terms of use.37  Even Supreme Court Chief Justice 
John Roberts has admitted he does not read the fine print on websites.38  
Yet these agreements are routinely enforced, although not without great 
debate.39 
Online standard-form contracts are typically categorized as “clickwrap” 
or “browsewrap” agreements, although that distinction can be blurred at 
times.40  A clickwrap agreement requires some kind of affirmative act like 
the click of a mouse on a button indicating an assent prior to accessing a 
website.41  Browsewrap agreements dictate that additional browsing past 
the homepage constitutes acceptance of the contract.42  Terms of use 
agreements, which often incorporate privacy policies, are types of 
clickwrap and browsewrap agreements. 
These agreements contain many standard terms, such as arbitration 
clauses, damage limitations, and warranty disclaimers.43  Increasingly, 
terms of use also include consent to spyware clauses,44 vague behavioral 
restrictions,45 and severe limitations on the use of content from the 
website.46 
                                                          
 37. YANNIS BAKOS ET AL., DOES ANYONE READ THE FINE PRINT?  TESTING A LAW AND 
ECONOMICS APPROACH TO STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS 2 (NYU Center for Law, 
Economics and Organization, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Working Paper 09-
40, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443256; see also Greenberg, supra note 3. 
 38. Debra Cassens Weiss, Chief Justice Roberts Admits He Doesn’t Read the Computer 
Fine Print, ABA JOURNAL LAW NEWS NOW (Oct 20, 2010, 7:17 AM),  
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chief_justice_roberts_admits_he_doesnt_read_the_
computer_fine_print/.  Chief Justice Roberts also stated that standard-form agreements were 
a problem without a clear answer.  Id. 
 39. See, e.g., Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 800 n.10 
(2007) (citing Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability 
and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1993)); Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, 
Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1311 (2005). 
 40. See, e.g., Hotels.com v. Canales, 195 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) 
(resolving that the user agreement on the Hotels.com website could not “neatly be 
characterized as either a ‘click-wrap’ or ‘browse-wrap’ agreement”). 
 41. See Kim, supra note 39, at 799. 
 42. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004); Specht v. 
Netscape Comm. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 22 n.4 (2d Cir. 2002) (describing “click-wrap” 
agreements); Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981–82 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 
 43. Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to Standard Form 
Contracts:  In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L. REV. 227, 229 
(2007). 
 44. Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware:  Questioning the Propriety of Contractual 
Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545, 1547 (2006) (articulating that 
consumers often agree to have spyware loaded onto their computers without realizing it). 
 45. See, e.g., Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 5 (“You will not post 
content or take any action on Facebook that infringes or violates someone else’s rights.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Terms of Use, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Jan. 25, 2005), 
http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/terms_of_use/ (asserting that users cannot “reuse, republish 
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The parties’ state of mind during the formation of these agreements is 
irrelevant.  Rather, courts consider what the parties objectively conveyed to 
each other in what is known as “the objective theory of contract.”47  Only 
external acts and manifestations, not subjective, internal intentions, 
determine mutual assent to a contract.48  When a website contains the 
phrase, “we respect your privacy,” it does not matter what the website 
intended.49  The question is what a reasonable person in the user’s position 
would have understood from that communication.50  Thus, online, courts 
should consider the entire user experience to adequately understand the 
average user. 
Although courts analyze online contracts according to traditional 
principles of contract law, two special problems arise in the context of 
online agreements:  requirements of noticeable presentation of offers and 
formations of assent.  Both problems arise due to the unique features of 
websites.  In interpreting online contracts, courts “focus on whether the 
plaintiff had reasonable notice of and manifested assent to the online 
agreement.”51  Specifically regarding browsewrap agreements, courts have 
held that whether these agreements are valid depends on the website user’s 
“actual or constructive knowledge” of the terms and conditions employed 
by the site, prior to using it.52  Thus, to be bound, parties need not have an 
actual “meeting of the minds.”53  Rather, a reasonable communication of 
the terms will suffice.54 
The reasonable communication requirement is a combination “of 
reasonable notice of the contractual nature of the offered terms and the 
opportunity to review those terms,” which serves as a “proxy for the 
offeree’s clear manifestation of assent.”55  A reasonable communication of 
                                                          
or otherwise distribute the content or any modified or altered versions of it, whether over the 
Internet or otherwise, and whether or not for payment,” without the written permission of 
the website or a third-party copyright holder). 
 47. Moringiello, supra note 39, at 1311. 
 48. Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1119–
20 (2008). 
 49. See id. at 1120 (noting that “contract formation depends on what is communicated, 
not what is merely thought”).  
 50. Id. at 1125. 
 51. Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., No. 4:07CV1963 CDP, 2009 WL 586513, at *2 (E.D. 
Mo. Mar. 6, 2009) (citing Specht v. Netscape Comm. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28–30 (2d Cir. 
2002); Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007)). 
 52. Id. at *3 n.5 (citations omitted). 
 53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 cmt. c (1981) (noting that 
although the element of agreement in contracts is also known as the “meeting of the minds,” 
“it is clear that a mental reservation of a party to a bargain does not impair the obligation he 
purports to undertake”). 
 54. See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(detailing that by using Register.com’s Internet product, the end user received both “notice 
and presentation of the proposed terms”). 
 55. Moringiello, supra note 39, at 1314. 
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terms gives rise to what is commonly referred to as the offeree’s “duty to 
read.”56  In other words, if the terms of a contract are reasonably 
communicated, the offeree cannot be absolved from liability for failing to 
read them because the offeree had a legal duty to do so.57 
The notice requirement is fulfilled differently for clickwrap agreements 
and browsewrap agreements.58  While notice for clickwrap agreements can 
be satisfied by using code to prohibit a user from proceeding without first 
having the opportunity to review the contract, notice in browsewrap 
agreements “is given through the conspicuous display of the contract.”59 
Assent to a contract is typically manifested in the process of offer and 
acceptance,60 both of which are demonstrated by “an outward manifestation 
of intent to be bound.”61  By manifesting intent to be bound by a contract, 
adherents assume the duty to read.62  The practical result of this duty is that 
individuals who objectively agreed to be bound by contract will be deemed 
to have agreed to all terms contained in the writing, regardless of whether 
they read the terms or understood them.63 
Courts appear to have reached a loose consensus in applying standard-
form doctrine to online agreements.  Courts tend to enforce clickwrap 
agreements that require an action on the part of the user, but they tend to 
shy away from enforcing browsewrap agreements that require no outward 
manifestation of asset.64  Courts oscillate on “notice sentence 
browsewraps,” which provide users with a link to terms of use but do not 
require users to acknowledge that they have seen them.65  
Thus, standard-form contract doctrine on the Web, while controversial, 
is relatively stable.  Courts relying on this doctrine give great weight to the 
specific language of the terms, often with little regard to other 
                                                          
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. at 1314–15 (observing that courts will typically enforce standard-form 
contracts so long as the user has notice of the terms, subject to limited exceptions, such as 
unconscionability). 
 58. Ian Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They Are 
Wrapped Up To Be?, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173, 176 (2007). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability:  The Case for Using “Knowing 
Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 475 (2008). 
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 476. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Mutually Assured Protection:  Toward Development of 
Relational Internet Data Security and Privacy Contracting Norms, in SECURING PRIVACY IN 
THE INTERNET AGE 78–79 (Anupam Chander et al. eds., 2008); see also Juliet M. 
Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace:  Electronic 
Contracting Cases 2007–2008, 64 BUS. LAW. 199, 218 (2008) (“After some early forays 
into a separate set of legal principles for electronic transactions, it is now clear that common 
law rules fit them well.”). 
 65. Matwyshyn, supra note 64, at 79. 
HARTZOG.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2011  3:04 PM 
2011] WEBSITE DESIGN AS CONTRACT 1645 
understandings and representations that arise within relationships.66  These 
terms have great significance for user privacy, but they do not always 
reflect the complete understanding between the parties.  Professor Mark 
Lemley criticized online terms of use, stating “more and more courts and 
commentators seem willing to accept the idea that if a business writes a 
document and calls it a contract, courts will enforce it as a contract even if 
no one agrees to it.”67 
B. The Danger of Over-Reliance on Standard-Form Contracts 
Courts that solely rely on standard-form contracts threaten user privacy 
by ignoring other elements of the contractual relationship between the 
website and user.  Of the many ways that standard-form contracts threaten 
privacy, this section will address liability shields created by a standard-
form contract, the problem of presumed consent, and standard-form 
contracts superseding the weak existing legislation on the issue. 
Fundamentally, contracts exist to bind parties to promises by creating 
legal obligations.68  On a website, these promises can be made in nearly 
any form and can appear anywhere.  Promises made as part of a negotiation 
can be more attractive for users; negotiation is typically deliberative, thus 
negotiated terms are presumably understood and satisfactory to contract 
adherents.  The same cannot regularly be said for terms in standard-form 
contracts. 
Scholars writing about intellectual property, alternative dispute 
resolution, and limitations on liability have all observed the impact of 
standard-form contracts.69  Those areas typically have a standard “default” 
position in the absence of contractual provisions.70  If a website’s terms of 
use fail to grant the appropriate licenses, then implied licenses will exist to 
govern the use of intellectual property, and the parties will retain their 
rights.71  If a contract fails to include an arbitration clause, then courts are 
the default arbiter of disputes.  Similarly, the Uniform Commercial Code 
                                                          
 66. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1 (noting that courts look to the language of the 
privacy policy to determine whether the right to privacy was waived). 
 67. Lemley, supra note 28, at 459. 
 68. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 4 (1999); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981) (defining a contract as “a promise or a set of promises 
for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in 
some way recognizes as a duty”). 
 69. See Barnes, supra note 44, at 1547–48; Lemley, supra note 28, at 459–62. 
 70. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps In Incomplete Contracts:  
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (postulating that default 
rules serve as gap-fillers in contracts that are incomplete); Robert E. Scott, A Relational 
Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 598 (1990) 
(describing the debate regarding default rules). 
 71. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 28, at 477. 
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(UCC) provides guidance for warranties and disclaimers.72  Yet, the law 
regarding the default status of self-disclosed information online is 
inconsistent and unpredictable.73  Thus, for good or bad, contracts that 
address privacy issues provide a degree of clarity.74 
Duties of confidentiality may also extend to websites when they promise 
to protect users.  These promises can often be found in a website’s privacy 
policy.  Privacy policies explain how a website will use a visitor’s personal 
information.75  While privacy policies, standing alone, are seen as 
unenforceable statements of policy, many websites incorporate the policy 
into their terms of use so that it binds users.76  According to Professor 
Allyson Haynes, although privacy policies typically include “a slew of 
terms both relating to privacy . . . and relating to other rights of the 
consumer,”77 many prominent court decisions addressing breach of contract 
claims arising from privacy policies have not enforced the privacy policy 
against the website owner.78 
According to Haynes, such binding policies can actually provide a 
liability shield for companies looking to take advantage of users’ failure to 
                                                          
 72. See U.C.C. § 2–313 (1999) (describing the creation of express warranties); see also 
Warkentine, supra note 60, at 526. 
 73. See Woodrow Hartzog, Promises and Privacy:  Promissory Estoppel and 
Confidential Disclosure in Online Communities, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 891, 891 (2009) (voicing 
that traditional remedies usually fail in online privacy claims); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A 
Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 921 (2005) (discussing how 
different states can have drastically different takes on individual privacy protection for 
information on social networks). 
 74. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1125, 1127 (2000) (citing PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS:  
WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 8 
(1998)).  Swire and Litan took notice of this leverage, stating:   
Consider the incentives of a company that acquires private information.  The 
company gains the full benefit of using the information in its own marketing efforts 
or in the fee it receives when it sells the information to third parties.  The company, 
however, does not suffer losses from the disclosure of private information.  
Because customers often will not learn of the overdisclosure, they may not be able 
to discipline the company effectively . . . .  It can be daunting for an individual 
consumer to bargain with a distant Internet merchant . . . about the desired level of 
privacy. 
Id. 
 75. Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies:  Contracting Away Control Over 
Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 594 (2007). 
 76. Id. at 596. 
 77. Id. at 597. 
 78. See, e.g., In re Jet Blue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 316–17 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (examining an airline’s privacy policy to determine whether plaintiffs had 
a claim for reliance); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 
2004) (finding that plaintiffs failed to allege that they read, understood or relied upon the 
privacy policy and thus failed to allege contractual damages); In re Nw. Airlines Privacy 
Litig., No. Civ. 04-126(PAM/JSM), 2004 WL 1278459, at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) 
(finding that the privacy statement did not constitute a unilateral contract and that plaintiff 
must have read the policy to rely on it). 
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read by selling or sharing users’ personal information.79  The policies 
essentially allow websites to track and exploit user information.80  Even 
users who attempt to educate themselves about websites’ privacy policies 
often do not fully understand the policies and the powers they give 
websites regarding the use of personal information.  Professor Nancy Kim 
observed that websites may respond to customer ignorance or inaction by 
inserting increasingly more aggressive and intrusive terms in “‘wrap 
contracts.”81  A number of lawsuits have been filed by website users 
claiming breach of contract and promissory estoppel resulting from a 
website’s violation of its privacy policy, with mixed results.82 
Applying a strict standard-form contract analysis, a number of courts 
have denied any meaningful recovery for a website breaking promises it 
made in a privacy policy.83  As will be discussed in Part II, by focusing 
solely on language in the terms, courts are excluding aspects of the 
relationship between the user and the website that could aid in the 
interpretation of vague terms in the policy or give rise to additional implied 
promises of confidentiality.84 
Another danger of standard-form contracts, and one of their most 
powerful uses, is obtaining user consent.85  This consent is often relied 
upon by websites when they deploy “spyware”—software that collects and 
transmits personal information and is often surreptitiously downloaded 
                                                          
 79. Haynes, supra note 75, at 588. 
 80. KIM, supra note 30, at 1. 
 81. Id. 
 82. E.g., Complaint at 18–19, Strickland-Saffold v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., No. CV-
10-723512 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 7, 2010), dismissed by plaintiffs, Notice of Dismissal 
with Prejudice Under Rule 41(A)(1)(a) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure (Dec. 30, 
2010); cf. McVicker v. King, 266 F.R.D. 92, 97 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (denying motion to compel 
a website’s anonymous users’ identities); Sedersten v. Taylor, No. 09-3031-CV-S-GAF, 
2009 WL 4802567, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009) (denying motion to compel anonymous 
poster’s identity from a news website). 
 83. See, e.g., In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d at 327 
(holding that the plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation to be compensated for their 
personal information and therefore could not sustain their breach of contract claim); Dyer, 
334 F. Supp. 2d at 1200 (finding that plaintiffs failed to allege that they read, understood, or 
relied upon the privacy policy and failed to allege contractual damages); In re Nw. Airlines 
Privacy Litig., 2004 WL 1278459, at *6 (finding that the privacy statement did not 
constitute a unilateral contract and that plaintiff must have read the policy to rely on it). 
 84. See also McClurg, supra note 19, at 888 (discussing the threat to intimate 
relationships posed by the Internet and lack of enforcement of the public disclosure tort); 
Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path:  Recovering the Law of 
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 156–58 (2007) (arguing that the breach of confidentiality 
tort has been limited, not reaching its potential). 
 85. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 529, 548 (2007) 
(“The legal nexus of digital consent is contract law.  For many bodies of law, the technology 
revolution has added a complicating factor to the legal equation; in contract law, the uneasy 
peace of doctrine around form contracts/contracts of adhesion has been permanently 
disrupted.”). 
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onto an individual’s computer.86  According to Professor Wayne Barnes, 
consumer assent to spyware installation is rarely debated, but in truth “the 
privacy implications of spyware are profound.”87  Individuals typically 
receive some modest benefit, such as software that entertains or offers a 
service, and as consideration, the user agrees to let the program install 
spyware.88 
Central to the issue of consent is the possible failure of the users to 
adequately understand the consequences of their consent—or to recognize 
that they are consenting to anything at all.89  The significance of an 
individual’s contractual consent stretches beyond the actions and remedies 
in contracts and into statutes, common law, and even constitutional law.90  
But consent can also frustrate a user’s claim for breach of contract.  By 
looking only at the terms providing for consent to the collection and use of 
information,91 courts potentially exclude elements important for valid 
consent.  For example, did the website promise to respect a user’s privacy 
preferences?  If so, has the user revoked consent to the collection or use of 
certain pieces of information by expressing those preferences?  
Additionally, was the website designed in such a way as to frustrate or 
corrupt consent to the proposed terms? 
Because online agreements are typically drafted to protect the website, 
they often have a negative effect on a website user’s privacy.92  Most 
privacy disputes involving online agreements look to the “consensual” 
aspect of the agreement.93  Judges have struggled to support the privacy 
interests of individuals when those individuals have consented to 
surveillance, collection, or use of their information.94 
                                                          
 86. Barnes, supra note 44, at 1545. 
 87. Id. at 1547. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. at 1595, 1597 (explaining that hardly any users bother to read or fully 
understand privacy agreements). 
 90. See generally Matwyshyn, supra note 85, at 531–32 (introducing the legal “noise” 
created by crossing legal disciplines). Matwyshyn proposed a “reasonable digital consumer” 
standard of consent created through empirical research instead of the current standard, 
which is something of a legal fiction. 
 91. See infra note 98 (highlighting cases where courts have looked to the terms of use 
in their decisions). 
 92. BONNEAU & PREIBUSCH, supra note 32, at 24 (explaining that privacy policies often 
reserve the right for websites to collect user data, such as IP addresses, while giving few 
meaningful rights to users); Barnes, supra note 44, at 1545 (noting that online agreements 
often include provisions in which users “consent” to have spyware placed on their 
computers); Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to Play:  Are Passive Online Media Users 
Bound by Terms of Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 414 (2010) (asserting that users often 
have little understanding of what they are agreeing to because online agreements are 
typically long and filled with legalese). 
 93. Cf. Barnes, supra note 44, at 1571 (noting that virtually all existing or proposed 
laws applicable to spyware contain an element of consent). 
 94. See infra notes 98–99. 
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Courts vary in requiring that an individual have read a contract to 
effectuate consent, depending on the kind of legal challenge.95  In Fourth 
Amendment disputes, most courts seem to hold users to their “duty to 
read.”96  Yet the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has, in at least one 
dispute, held that, despite manifesting objective consent to be bound by an 
agreement, a website’s failure to present terms that impact an individual’s 
privacy clearly and conspicuously constituted an unfair and deceptive trade 
practice.97 
However, many courts have typically found that terms of use can dispel 
an expectation of privacy regardless of whether the user actually read the 
terms.98  Terms of use can also be used as evidence to destroy a user’s 
anonymity.99  Jonathan Sobel, Karen Petrulakis, and Denelle Dixon-Thayer 
have noted that the failure to enact an all-encompassing statutory regime to 
protect privacy has resulted in Congress turning to the contractual 
“concepts of notice, opt-out, and information access to protect privacy 
rights.”100  Contracts can also grant consent for activity otherwise 
prohibited by statute, such as government surveillance.101  Ultimately, this 
patchwork of legislation reveals that standard-form contracts serve as the 
catalyst for a great deal of statutory provisions that can affect a user’s 
                                                          
 95. See supra note 78 (identifying cases where courts looked to whether the plaintiffs 
had read the agreements entered into). 
 96. See, e.g., United States v. Hart, No. 08-109-C, 2009 WL 2552347, at *18 (W.D. Ky. 
Aug. 17, 2009) (finding the plaintiff’s expectation of privacy destroyed by the terms of 
Yahoo!’s privacy policy); Lukowski v. County of Seneca, No. 08-CV-6098, 2009 WL 
467075, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2009) (noting that while users may have a subjective 
expectation of privacy, the terms of the service agreement are relevant to determine the 
objective expectation of privacy). 
 97. See Complaint at 5, In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4264 
(F.T.C. Aug. 31, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/index.shtm. 
 98. See, e.g., Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 526–27 (6th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing the various forms of terms and the resulting change in expectations of privacy); 
Hart, 2009 WL 2552347, at *18 (finding the plaintiff’s expectation of privacy destroyed by 
the terms of Yahoo!’s privacy policy); Lukowski, 2009 WL 467075, at *10 (noting the 
importance of terms in a subscriber agreement in determining the expectation of privacy). 
 99. See Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566–67 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (holding there was only a minimal expectation of privacy under the ISP’s terms of 
service). 
 100. Jonathan K. Sobel et. al., The Evolution of Data Protection as a Privacy Concern, 
and the Contract Law Dynamics Underlying It, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 
55, 57 (Anupam Chander et al. eds., 2008). 
 101. See, e.g., Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied:  Improper Use of the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 
MD. L. REV. 320, 322 (2004) (explaining how websites protect non-copyrightable data 
through the terms agreed to by users to access the websites); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, It’s 
Nobody’s Business, But You Still Cannot Lie About It:  Criminalizing Innocent Attempts to 
Maintain Cyber-privacy, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 377, 382–83 (2004) (discussing the 
implications of lying about one’s identity after consenting to terms to obtain access under 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act); Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope:  Interpreting 
“Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1596 
(2003) (explaining how breach of contract may now criminalize contract law on the 
Internet). 
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privacy.  As a result, there has never been a greater need for enhanced 
scrutiny of online agreements. 
II. THE CONTRACTUAL SIGNIFICANCE OF WEBSITE DESIGN 
Courts should no longer ignore the contractual significance of website 
design.  Standing alone, interactive features of a website might be little 
more than bells and whistles.  However, many websites make user privacy 
and, by extension, user privacy settings, a central feature of the user’s 
experience and a prominent part of the terms of use.  Because websites that 
employ these features are in a contractual relationship with their users, 
website design should be part of an online agreement when it is 
incorporated into or consistent with the terms of use. 
Contracts were a part of everyday life long before the Internet, but they 
were largely formed in the commercial or transactional contexts—not in 
the contexts of social interaction and media consumption.102  After all, 
when one turns on the television, listens to the radio, or reads a newspaper, 
contractual relationships are not formed.  Every time one picks up the 
phone or gossips in the hallway, no one presents long and confusing terms 
dictating what kinds of communications are acceptable.  Yet virtually every 
time individuals access a website, they are asked to agree to a cadre of 
terms against which their only recourse has been simply to close their 
browser or go to a different website. 
As our experience online grows richer, our relationships with websites 
and other website users become more nuanced.  Courts should better 
consider these nuances and the context in which information is disclosed 
when interpreting online agreements.  This section explores the under-
analyzed elements of online agreements that exist outside of websites’ 
explicit terms of use and privacy policies.  Recognition of these elements—
code-based promises, malicious interfaces, and the operational reality of 
the contracting parties—could reduce the schism between contracts as a 
source of, and solution for, privacy problems online. 
The threats to privacy posed by online agreements are created by the 
same problem inherent in employing contracts as a solution to regulate 
privacy:  lack of meaningful choice.103  Professor Jerry Kang recognized 
                                                          
 102. See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers:  The Relation Between 
Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 832 (1998) 
(recognizing that the underlying purpose of contracts is to conduct commerce and 
transactions).  
 103. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON:  TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE 105–06 (2004) (arguing that providing people with opt-out rights 
and privacy policies does not give those people control); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death 
of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1464, 1502 (2000) (stating that total secrecy is 
impractical today and expecting individuals to contract for confidentiality is unrealistic); 
Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1229 
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this hurdle, stating “[t]he strongest challenge to the market solution [to 
privacy harms] is that ‘consent’ is coerced and not truly voluntary in the 
marketplace.”104  This coercion essentially forces users to relinquish control 
of their personal information, even when they would rather not.105  
Although website users can reject the contract wholesale, the choice 
becomes meaningless when services, important information, and social 
networks are only available on a single website.  For example, Facebook 
users cannot re-create their network on a different social network website 
without convincing the other Facebook users to leave as well. 
That a pure standard-form contracts approach to protecting privacy 
leaves little opportunity for meaningful choice does not mean that the 
contractual approach to protecting privacy should be abandoned.  Rather, a 
more nuanced contractual approach that provides users with the ability to 
tailor the contract to suit them could be beneficial.106  Such flexibility 
affords users a meaningful choice.107  Indeed, Professor Pamela Samuelson 
stated that contracts as a legal tool provide flexibility to “accommodate the 
multiple interests people have in personal information, the contextual 
nature of determinations about the appropriateness of collection or use of 
personal data, the significance of consent as a factor in determining 
appropriate uses, and the evolutionary nature of social understanding about 
information privacy.”108  On the Internet, individuals can exercise a higher 
degree of control over personal data.109 
Before this level of control may be exercised, however, new practices 
must be put into place.110  According to Professor Matwyshyn, the “new 
legal construction should be inherently relational; it should create 
confluence of interests in data security between content providers and users 
and better reflect the commercial value of user data.”111 
While consent to the use of personal information is regularly found in 
terms of use via an omnibus or blanket level of assent to all terms,112 it 
typically remains a legal fiction.  Most individuals simply do not read the 
                                                          
(1998) (explaining how user information can be tracked with detail as standard elements of 
browsing the Internet); William McGeveran, Note, Programmed Privacy Promises:  P3P 
and Web Privacy Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1812, 1818–20 (2001) (noting the ease in which 
personal data can be collected on the Internet because of its characteristics). 
 104. Kang, supra note 103, at 1265. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Steven A. Bibas, Annual I.H.S.–Eberhard Student Writing Competition Winner, 
A Contractual Approach to Data Privacy, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 609 (1994). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Samuelson, supra note 74, at 1172. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Matwyshyn, supra note 64, at 74. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See supra notes 23, 25. 
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terms,113 and even if they did, most individuals have difficulty fully 
comprehending what they actually agreed to and the risk they inherited by 
that consent.114  Broad, sweeping agreements that control the use of 
personal information lack the specificity to be truly effective in providing 
meaningful control over the flow of personal information because users 
often disclose both sensitive and innocuous personal information on the 
same website. 
Privacy-related agreements could be much more effective on a micro-
level.  Smaller, discrete agreements for confidentiality regarding specific 
pieces of information could be more effective than one all-encompassing 
agreement regarding the protection of personal information.  Because 
individuals do not consider all information they disclose to be uniformly 
public or private, it is not surprising that contracts forcing them to do just 
that are of limited effectiveness.115 This Article offers three related 
suggestions for the analysis of online agreements.  These proposals are not 
advocating extreme modifications to established rules of contract formation 
and interpretation.  Rather, they are suggestions for a magnified 
examination of the true relationship between websites and users. 
First, courts should broaden their consideration of what constitutes a 
promise by better recognizing when websites have clearly offered to keep 
information confidential through website design, icons, or features.116  For 
example, in some contexts, features such as privacy settings or icons such 
as padlocks could reasonably be perceived as offers by the website to 
protect certain pieces of information.  Second, courts should better 
recognize the role that malicious website interfaces play in invalidating true 
agreements between the parties.117  Features such as misleading links, 
disabled back buttons, unnecessary and confusing forms, and pop-ups 
covering desired content could all frustrate contract formation.  Third, if 
                                                          
 113. See JOSHUA GOMEZ ET AL., KNOWPRIVACY 11 (2009), available at 
http://knowprivacy.org/report/KnowPrivacy_Final_Report.pdf (stating that privacy policies 
are not usually read, in part, because users cannot understand them); Lee Goldman, 
Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171, 192 
(2003) (believing that consumers will not read disclosures or form agreements but will 
simply sign where told to sign); Rakoff, supra note 26, at 1179 (finding a near universal 
scholarly and empirical consensus that consumers do not read contracts prior to signing 
them); Sobel, supra note 100, at 66 (noting that contract law is an imperfect tool because 
most contracts are not usually read); Warkentine, supra note 60, at 469 (introducing the 
article with the statement that standard-form contracts are rarely read by their signers). 
 114. See Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form 
Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 121 (2007) (finding that consumers are unlikely to give the 
terms the full meaning and importance they deserve). 
  115. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT:  TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 125–26 (2010) (arguing against what she refers to as the 
“public/private” dichotomy). 
  116. See infra Part II.A. 
  117. See infra Part II.B. 
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online agreements are offered as evidence in privacy disputes, courts 
should not limit their analysis to the explicit terms of use.  Instead, courts 
should consider the “operational realities” outside of the terms of use that 
induced reliance on a promise of confidentiality, such as whether other 
parts of the website either contradicted the terms or filled in ambiguous 
terms.118 
A. Design as Promise 
A promise does not have to be in words to be binding.119  A promise can 
be any “manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a 
specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a 
commitment has been made.”120  Promises as part of an otherwise valid 
contract or one detrimentally relied upon can be enforced by law.121   
It is puzzling that courts have focused almost entirely on the language in 
terms of use and privacy policies when analyzing online agreements.  
Those terms are not the only reasonably perceived promises in a website.  
In some contexts, website code—page design, icons, or features—can 
reasonably be perceived as an offer or promise by the website to protect 
certain pieces of information. 
1. Privacy indicators 
A growing body of literature in the field of human-computer interaction 
has focused on what are known as “privacy indicators”—designs such as 
logos, icons, settings, and seals used to intuitively convey a website’s 
policy regarding collection and use of personal information.122  For 
                                                          
  118. See infra Part II.C. 
  119.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) (“A promise may be stated in 
words either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct.”); id. § 19(1) 
(“The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken words or 
by other acts or by failure to act.”); see also McClurg, supra note 19, at 912–13 (stating 
promises can be inferred from conduct). 
 120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981). 
 121. See id. §§ 2(1), 90(1) (outlining that a promise may be a manifestation of intention, 
such as a provision in a contract or which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce 
action or forbearance). 
 122. See SERGE EGELMAN ET AL., STUDYING THE IMPACT OF PRIVACY INFORMATION ON 
ONLINE PURCHASE DECISIONS 1 (2006) (describing P3P privacy policies and the use of 
Privacy Finder to identify websites with privacy settings matching a user’s preferences); 
SERGE EGELMAN ET AL., TIMING IS EVERYTHING?  THE EFFECTS OF TIMING AND PLACEMENT 
OF ONLINE PRIVACY INDICATORS 1 (2009) (observing that consumers took into account 
privacy indicators, when available, when purchasing from websites); JULIA GIDEON ET AL., 
POWER STRIPS, PROPHYLACTICS, AND PRIVACY, OH MY! 1 (2006) (finding that privacy policy 
comparison information had an impact on non-privacy-sensitive purchases but more 
influence on privacy-sensitive purchases); JANICE TSAI ET AL., SYMBOLS OF PRIVACY 2 
(2006) (concluding that even ambiguously defined privacy symbols made users more 
comfortable with doing business with a website); Lorrie Faith Cranor, What Do They 
“Indicate?”  Evaluating Security and Privacy Indicators, INTERACTIONS, May–June 2006, 
at 45 (noting the disappointing effectiveness of privacy indicators because of the ease in 
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example, padlock icons located in the bottom right corner of web browsers 
often indicate the presence of a secure sockets layer (SSL) connection 
between the browser and a website.123  Similar padlock icons are used on 
Facebook to indicate that certain settings have been adjusted to restrict 
access to, or otherwise protect, information.124  A number of websites 
employ “privacy seals” like TRUSTe to assure users of the website’s 
responsible privacy practices.125  Amazon.com allows users to create a 
public profile and “private wish lists.”  Amazon reinforces the confidential 
nature of these private lists by encouraging users to also create lists that 
friends can see.126  Twitter provides that only followers approved by the 
user will receive a user’s tweets when giving users the option to protect 
their disclosures.127  (Is Twitter representing that they will not share these 
protected disclosures with any other parties?  After all, Twitter did not 
include “protected tweets” when they gave the Library of Congress every 
tweet from every public account for archival.128) 
These indicators are designed to improve consumer confidence and 
instill consumer trust in a website’s privacy practices.129  Researchers like 
Victoria Groom, M. Ryan Calo, and Alessandro Acquisiti have found that 
many of these icons can elicit a visceral response from website users.130  
Calo has observed how anthropomorphic features in code can affect a 
user’s perception of website privacy because “[h]uman-computer interfaces 
                                                          
fooling humans).  A full explication of code-based promises is outside the scope of this 
Article but will be addressed in future research. 
 123. Cranor, supra note 122, at 45. 
 124. Help Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/home.php#!/help/?ref=pf (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2011) (representing the “Safety Center” link with a padlock). 
 125. EGELMAN ET AL., TIMING IS EVERYTHING?  THE EFFECTS OF TIMING AND PLACEMENT 
OF ONLINE PRIVACY INDICATORS, supra note 122, at 2. 
 126. Making Your Wish List Searchable, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/ 
help/customer/display.html?nodeId=501094 (last visited Aug. 9, 2011); Your Account, 
AMAZON.COM, https://www.amazon.com/gp/css/homepage.html?ie=UTF8&ref_=topnav_ya 
(last visited May 21, 2011). 
 127. Account Settings, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/settings/account (last visited Aug. 9, 
2011). 
 128. See Benny Evangelista, Tweets Preserved for All Time Under Library of Congress 
Deal, SFGATE, Apr. 16, 2010, http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-04-
16/business/20851780_1_tweets-biz-stone-library (“The only exceptions are tweets from a 
small percentage of protected accounts.”). 
 129. EGELMAN ET AL., TIMING IS EVERYTHING?  THE EFFECTS OF TIMING AND PLACEMENT 
OF ONLINE PRIVACY INDICATORS, supra note 122, at 2; TSAI ET AL., supra note 122, at 1. 
 130. See VICTORIA GROOM & M. RYAN CALO, USER EXPERIENCE AS A FORM OF PRIVACY 
NOTICE:  AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author); M. Ryan Calo, 
Against Notice Skepticism, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1790144 (fearing that most adults who 
see the terms “privacy policy” assume the website safeguards information, regardless of the 
website’s actual practice); Leslie K. John, Alessandro Acquisti & George Lowenstein, 
Strangers on a Plane:  Context-Dependent Willingness to Divulge Sensitive Information, 37 
J. OF CONSUMER RES. 858, 868 (2011) (finding that privacy concern was incommensurate 
with the objective dangers of disclosure). 
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that introduce an apparent person at the site of collection may resolve the 
notice [of a privacy threat] problem in a direct and more salient way:  
through a visceral reminder that the data being collected will be used and 
shared.”131  Judges should better recognize that users exposed to 
anthropomorphic features are generally more receptive to the information 
conveyed and, thus, might internalize that information better than fine-print 
legalese. 
Regardless of accuracy, many users believe that websites with privacy 
indicators have adopted consumer-friendly practices.132  A team of 
researchers from the Annenberg Public Policy Center and the Samuelson 
Law, Technology, and Public Policy Clinic found in a 2006 study that 
when users see the term “privacy policy” on a website, “they assume that a 
web site will not share their personal information.”133 
This research demonstrates that users can perceive (or misperceive) 
website features, short phrases, icons, and other privacy indicators as 
representative of a website’s privacy promises.  In some contexts, these 
representations should become part of an online agreement.  To the extent a 
website promises in language or in code to respect a user’s preferences for 
privacy, user actions such as deleting information and adjusting privacy 
settings could be considered acceptances of offers to protect information. 
Because users are constrained by code (they generally cannot effectively 
negotiate with a website using words), the online interaction takes on 
additional significance.  Instead of simply meaning “I wish to delete this 
information,” user activity could mean “I wish to protect this information, 
so I am accepting your offer to take it down and keep it confidential.” 
2. Working with the fine print 
By failing to recognize code-based promises, courts risk ignoring the 
many ways that contracts can be formed digitally.  Recognition of code-
based acceptances, such as use of privacy settings, could also fulfill the 
desired “modicum of bilaterality” capable of defeating some claims of 
unconscionability.134  In light of online communication, many courts are 
already beginning to deviate from the old theoretical framework135 and 
                                                          
 131. M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake:  A New Dimension to Privacy and 
Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809, 849 (2010); see also Calo, Against 
Notice Skepticism, supra note 130. 
 132. EGELMAN ET AL., TIMING IS EVERYTHING?  THE EFFECTS OF TIMING AND PLACEMENT 
OF ONLINE PRIVACY INDICATORS, supra note 122, at 2. 
 133. TUROW ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. 
 134. Cf. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing that the 
“modicum of bilaterality” required in arbitration agreements). 
 135. Amelia Rawls, Comment, Contract Formation in an Internet Age, 10 COLUM. SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 200, 219 (2009) (discussing that businesses are using new technologies to 
avoid liability and courts have begun to distance themselves from old theoretical 
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“have endorsed the view that while ‘some contracts are formed and their 
terms fully defined at a single point in time, many transactions involve a 
rolling or layered process.’”136  This more nuanced analysis of contract 
formation could recognize a privacy policy or terms of use as one layer and 
code-based promises as additional layers of the agreement. 
No matter how many layers are perceived, an offer must be included for 
a contract to be formed.  The great contracts scholar Arthur Corbin defined 
an offer as “an act whereby one person confers upon another the power to 
create contractual relations between them.”137  Under this Article’s 
proposal, the option provided by the website in code could be interpreted 
by the courts as an offer to keep information confidential.  As discussed 
previously, the objective theory of contracts holds that it is not the 
subjective intent of the website that dictates the parties’ obligations but 
rather what the expression of intent objectively conveys to the other 
party.138  Corbin stated, “[w]hat kind of act creates a power of acceptance 
and is therefore an offer?  It must be an expression of will or intention.  It 
must be an act that leads the offeree reasonably to believe that a power to 
create a contract is conferred upon him.”139 
This objective expression of intent for website design to be part of a 
contract can be found in a website’s terms of use and privacy policy.  
Terms of use and privacy policies often explicitly address ways a user can 
affect a website’s collection and use of personal information.  For example, 
Facebook’s terms of use agreement limits the scope of the license granted 
to the website according to the user’s privacy and application settings.140  
By incorporating references to the ability to alter personal information in an 
online agreement, these websites invite acceptance of offers of 
confidentiality.  An offer to keep deleted or protected information 
confidential need not be explicit to form a contract so long as such a 
manifestation of intent was otherwise conveyed.141 
                                                          
frameworks). 
 136. Id. (citing Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc. v. 
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software 
Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000)). 
 137. Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 
26 YALE L.J. 169, 181 (1917).  Corbin goes on to state that “the act of the offeror operates to 
create in the offeree a power . . . ; thereafter the voluntary act of the offeree alone will 
operate to create the new relations called a contract.”  Id. at 181–82. 
 138. See Barnes, supra note 48, at 1120 (explaining that, under the modern objective 
theory, manifestations of intent should be viewed from the point of view of a reasonable 
person as the other party). 
 139. Corbin, supra note 137, at 182. 
 140. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 5 (outlining what permissions a 
user gives to Facebook in relation to the type of content the user provides). 
 141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981) (“An offer is the 
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in 
understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.”). 
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Many privacy policies, such as the one provided by The New York 
Times,142 are given contractual effect through incorporation into the 
website’s terms of use.143  The New York Times privacy policy, which is 
part of the website’s terms of use agreement, promises not to “share 
personal information about you as an individual to third parties without 
your consent.”144  Following that clause, under the heading “Your Privacy 
Choices,” the agreement informs users “[t]o view and edit your personal 
information, please visit the appropriate part of any of our Web sites.”145  
By offering “privacy choices” and promising to disclose only that 
information consented to by the user, The New York Times effectively 
promises to protect information designated as private by the user. 
Promises can come in many forms on a website, but the fine print of 
privacy policies or terms of use and privacy settings have different effects 
on users.  Users who read or even scan privacy policies are more judicious 
regarding the disclosure of information,146 while users who utilize privacy 
settings tend to disclose more information than users who did not.147  
Researchers Fred Stutzman, Robert Capra, and Jamila Thompson have 
found that both privacy policy consumption and privacy behaviors, such as 
the utilization of privacy settings, were significant factors affecting 
disclosure on a social media site.  Because privacy policies and code-based 
features such as privacy settings are intertwined, courts should not ignore 
these code-based features in their contractual analysis. 
Some terms of use explicitly offer to protect the privacy of deleted or 
protected information.  In its terms of use, Myspace promises protection to 
users who take advantage of privacy protection features, providing:  
After you remove your Content from the Myspace Services we will 
cease distribution as soon as practicable, and at such time when 
distribution ceases, the license will terminate.  If after we have 
distributed your Content outside of the Myspace Services, you change 
the Content’s privacy setting to “private,” we will cease distribution of 
such “private” Content outside of the Myspace Services as soon as 
practicable after you make the change.148 
Facebook has also given contractual authority to a user’s privacy settings 
                                                          
 142. Privacy Policy Highlights, THE NEW YORK TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
content/help/rights/privacy/highlights/privacy-highlights.html (last updated Apr. 18, 2011). 
 143. Terms of Service, THE NEW YORK TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/content/help/ 
rights/terms/terms-of-service.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2011). 
 144. Privacy Policy Highlights, supra note 142. 
 145. Id. 
 146. FRED STUTZMAN ET AL., FACTORS MEDIATING DISCLOSURE IN SOCIAL NETWORK 
SITES 14 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
 147. Id. at 14–18. 
 148. Terms & Conditions, MYSPACE.COM, June 25, 2009, http://www.myspace.com/ 
help/terms. 
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in its statement of rights and responsibilities, stating in the terms of use that 
“[y]ou own all of the content and information you post on Facebook, and 
you can control how it is shared through your privacy and application 
settings” and that “[w]e require applications to respect your privacy.”149  
This language could be interpreted to create a contractual obligation to 
respect a user’s privacy preference because it has become a significant 
aspect of the contract between the user and the website. 
Two recent complaints demonstrate how Internet users might perceive 
indirect privacy settings as promises.  The complaint in Ferguson v. 
Classmates.com expresses a user’s reliance on a website’s promise of 
confidentiality via privacy settings, terms of use, and privacy policies.150  
This complaint, filed as a class action, asserted that Classmates.com, a 
school-based social network site, deceptively manipulated users’ privacy 
settings to expose previously “private” profiles in an attempt to generate 
business.151  Referring to the ability to protect information through privacy 
settings and statements made by the website, the complaint alleged that 
“[t]he promise of confidentiality and the ability of Classmates through 
various protections to deter unwanted intrusions and harassment have been 
important to Classmates’ ability to attract and retain Users.”152  In the claim 
for, among other things,153 breach of contract, the complaint asserts, 
“Before the recent events described in this Complaint, Classmates’ policies 
did not allow the dissemination of Users’ personal information to the 
general public, through undescribed ‘Applications,’ or otherwise.  The 
privacy provisions in place when Users subscribed constitute material 
contractual terms by which Classmates was bound, and remains bound.”154  
The inference of contractual obligation arising from promises to respect 
                                                          
 149. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 5.  Facebook’s terms of use 
agreement contains numerous references to the ability to control who sees your information 
via privacy settings:   
[S]ubject to your privacy and application settings:  you grant us a non-exclusive, 
transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content 
that you post on or in connection with Facebook (“IP License”). . . .  You can use 
your privacy settings to limit how your name and profile picture may be associated 
with commercial, sponsored, or related content (such as a brand you like) served or 
enhanced by us.  You give us permission to use your name and profile picture in 
connection with that content, subject to the limits you place. 
Id.  Yet, arguably, the default for some of the settings is contrary to the spirit of these terms.  
For example, the “Wall Photos” album is, by default, viewable by everyone.  Who Can See 
My “Wall Photos” Album?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=20139 (last 
visited June 3, 2011). 
 150. Class Action Complaint at 2, 4, Ferguson v. Classmates Online, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-
00365-RAJ (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 2010). 
 151. Id. at 3. 
 152. Id. at 7. 
 153. The complaint also asserts claims under the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act, the Washington Consumer Protection Act, and unjust enrichment.  Id. at 13–17. 
 154. Id. at 15–16. 
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user preferences of privacy lies at the heart of this Article’s proposal. 
In Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc.,155 the plaintiffs claimed relief under 
a theory of, among other things, promissory estoppel for promises to 
respect privacy settings.156  The plaintiffs alleged that Amazon.com ignored 
users’ Web-browser privacy settings to fraudulently collect personal 
information without permission and share it with other companies.157  
Essentially, the plaintiffs asserted they were tricked into believing the site 
emphasized privacy protection, when in reality the available privacy 
settings were useless.158  The users asserted they “reasonably relied upon 
Amazon’s promise to refrain from using cookies to collect PII and share 
PII with third parties without the user’s consent and thereby caused 
Plaintiffs . . . to choose to visit and make purchases on Amazon’s 
websites.”159  
Some courts have already enforced vague promises of privacy in terms 
of use and privacy policies.  In McVicker v. King,160 for example, the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
denied a request to compel the disclosure of records that could identify 
seven anonymous message-board commentators.161  The plaintiff asserted 
that the terms of use were too ambiguous to create an expectation of 
privacy because they did not explicitly provide that the identity of the user 
would be protected.162 
The court disagreed, finding instead that the terms of service listed for 
the blog gave the registered users an expectation of privacy.163  The terms 
                                                          
 155. Del Vecchio v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-00366-RSL (W.D. Wash. Mar. 2, 
2011). 
 156. Complaint at 23–24, Del Vecchio, No. 2:11-cv-00366-RSL. 
 157. Nick Eaton, Suit:  Amazon Fraudulently Collects, Shares Users’ Personal Info, 
SEATTLEPI.COM (Mar. 2, 2011, 10:00 PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/business/article/Suit-
Amazon-fraudulently-collects-shares-users-1040886.php#ixzz1JEgjzVWO. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Complaint at 23–24, Del Vecchio, No. 2:11-cv-00366-RSL. 
 160. 266 F.R.D. 92 (W.D. Pa. 2010). 
 161. Id. at 93. 
 162. Id. at 96.  The relevant terms were actually located in the website’s privacy policy, 
which was incorporated into the terms of use and stated that the website will use personally 
identifiable information   
only as permitted by law and [it] may be used to communicate with you about 
something you have posted, the community agreement, or privacy policy, products 
or services offered by YourSouthhills.com or the Company, administration of 
contests, processing e-commerce transactions or other topics the Company believes 
you may find interesting.  Personally identifiable information collected on the Site 
may also be used for other purposes, including, but not limited to, trouble-shooting 
and site administration.  Certain third parties, our e-mail service provider, for 
example, may access the information . . . .  The Company may also disclose your 
information in response to a court order, at other times when the Company believes 
it is reasonably required to do so . . . . 
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 163. Id. 
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of use stated:  “[p]rotecting consumer privacy online is important to us.  By 
taking steps to protect the privacy of our members, we also hope to 
increase members’ confidence in the site and as a result, increase their 
online activity.”164  The court found that “[t]he Privacy Policy clearly 
reflects that Trib Total Media will disclose its users personally identifiable 
information only in very limited situations” and thus gave users an 
expectation of privacy.165  Are the general promises made in privacy 
policies such as “we will protect your privacy” and “we respect your 
privacy settings” any clearer than the impressions conveyed by website 
features that allow users to identify the information they want to protect? 
This solution can be distilled to a simple proposition:  if a website 
promises to respect a user’s privacy preferences, then a user’s expression of 
privacy preferences through website features like privacy settings should 
serve to make the website’s promise binding.  While this proposal is 
essentially a modified opt-out system, it has several benefits that existing 
opt-out systems do not.  One benefit is that people who do not have time 
“to read through cumbersome documents describing obscure rules for 
controlling data”166 can still protect their privacy.  This way, unlike the 
current opt-out framework that, according to Professor Daniel Solove, 
“require[s] individuals to check a box, send a letter, make a telephone call, 
or take other proactive steps to indicate their preferences,”167 a website user 
would only need to continue using website features to delete or protect 
personal information.168 
Privacy scholars note that one of the largest problems with a contractual 
approach to privacy is the disparity in bargaining power between the 
parties.169  They point out that individuals are largely “contract term takers” 
in their dealings with organizations170 and that “[p]eople frequently accede 
to standardized contract terms without putting up much of a fight.”171 
                                                          
 164. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 165. Id. 
 166. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 160 (1999) (suggesting 
the creation of an electronic system to negotiate privacy policy terms). 
 167. SOLOVE, supra note 103, at 84; see also McGeveran, supra note 103, at 1852–53 
(discussing whether opt-in mandates are overly burdensome). 
 168. Facebook has seen most of its users select some form of privacy protection through 
the privacy settings and ability to un-tag or delete personal information offered by the 
website.  Cf. Ana Muller, Updates on Your New Privacy Tools, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (Dec. 
9, 2009, 3:19 PM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=197943902130 (requesting all 
350 million users to update their privacy settings).  Some websites, like Facebook, already 
keep track of this kind of information and would only need to quarantine the information 
and refrain from disclosing it.  Facebook’s Privacy Policy, supra note 6 (admitting that 
Facebook tracks certain actions such as adding connections or creating a photo album). 
 169. SOLOVE, supra note 103, at 82 (recognizing that when faced with a standard 
contract, individuals tend to accede without much debate or negotiation). 
 170. Id. (citing OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT:  A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 9 (1993)). 
 171. Id. (citing Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 
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The modified opt-out proposal offers users more meaningful control over 
the flow of their personal information notwithstanding standard-form 
contracts.  The contractual leverage could allow users to be more than a 
passive party in the “meeting of the minds.”  A reciprocal outcome is not 
just desirable from a public policy perspective—it also has legal 
significance in states like California that hold a “modicum of bilaterality” 
in contracts can help nullify claims of unconscionability.172 
3. The likelihood of reliance 
A modified opt-out solution is grounded in the reliance interest in 
enforcing contracts.  Websites’ promises to protect information should be 
enforced if they induced detrimental reliance.  Users virtually never read 
the terms of use, yet they routinely use privacy settings.  Thus, it is likely 
that website users will rely on representations made by significant features 
of website design more often than boilerplate terms of use.  This is 
particularly true when terms of use regarding privacy are vague. 
One of the maxims of contract law is that ambiguities in contractual 
terms should be interpreted against the drafter.173  Websites have the 
opportunity to craft terms of use, so this rule reflects an attempt to balance 
the inequities between two contractual parties.  Websites have complete 
control over the ability of users to delete information, utilize privacy 
settings, and remove identifying tags.  If websites choose to make these 
features available and promise to respect user preferences regarding 
privacy, should any ambiguities in an online agreement not be interpreted 
against the coder? 
Regarding contractual protection for privacy, Professor Daniel Solove 
notes that:  
[i]ndividuals are often presented with an all-or-nothing choice:  either 
agree to all forms of information collection and use or to none 
whatsoever.  Such a limited set of choices does not permit individuals to 
express their preferences accurately.  Individuals frequently desire to 
consent to certain uses of their personal information, but they do not 
want to relinquish their information for all possible future uses.174 
The user-action proposal helps alleviate some of the “omnibus” problem 
posed by vague and expansive language in contracts by allowing users to 
                                                          
822–23 (2000)). 
 172. See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that contractual 
terms were unconscionable when they banned class action suits, required 
telecommunications customers to submit disputes to arbitration, required the customers to 
split the cost of the arbitration, and required confidentiality). 
 173. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET. AL., CONTRACTS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 600 (6th ed. 
2001) (“One of the most time-honored maxims of contract interpretation is that a contract is 
to be interpreted contra proferentem (against its author or profferer).”). 
 174. SOLOVE, supra note 103, at 85. 
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determine what information should be protected on a more granular level, 
depending on what options are provided by a website. 
Ultimately, the user-action proposal simply suggests that courts take a 
more granular and contextual approach to contracts regarding privacy 
online.  By considering the messages conveyed by website design, courts 
could recognize the simple micro-agreements and additional promises 
governing pieces of information. 
4. The problems with website design as contract 
This proposal is not without weaknesses.  Increased website 
transparency would be required for the user to realize that an agreement 
with the website had been broken.175  Damages for these kinds of privacy 
harms are notoriously difficult to recover.176  However, a website’s failure 
to adhere to these agreements could be punished by the FTC in the same 
manner that the FTC pursues those who fail to abide by their own privacy 
policies.177  Additionally, the mere threat of a private cause of action could 
help deter reckless practices regarding a website’s disclosure of user 
information. 
Moreover, some evidence exists that users do not always understand 
exactly what information design features, like privacy settings, protect.178  
Thus, courts would need to make an additional finding as to what 
expectations of confidentiality or privacy were reasonable given the 
effectiveness of a particular design element.  Such a granular analysis 
would have to occur on a case-by-case basis, which could be laborious and 
inconsistent.  Although it is not always clear what each design feature 
protects, evidence that privacy settings are routinely deceiving website 
users only further supports the assertion that website design could lead to 
detrimental reliance—a hallmark of contract related doctrines such as 
                                                          
 175. See generally Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security 
Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 916 (2007) (suggesting that federal guidelines for breach 
notifications from financial institutions could be used to create a similar system for privacy 
breaches); Preston Thomas, Comment, Little Brother’s Big Book:  The Case for a Right of 
Audit in Private Databases, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 155, 156 (2009) (noting that an 
audit system would have to start small and be made in a piecemeal manner). 
 176. See, e.g., Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D. 2004) 
(finding that the plaintiffs failed to allege that they read, understood or relied upon the 
privacy policy and failed to allege contractual damages); see also In re JetBlue Airways 
Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (failing to find any viable 
claims against the defendant in relation to the defendant’s deceptive practices). 
 177. See, e.g., Cecilia Kang, Google, FTC settle privacy case, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 
2011, at A16 (reporting on a settlement with Google over, among other things, violation of 
its own privacy policies). 
 178. See, e.g., MICHELLE MADEJSKI ET AL., THE FAILURE OF ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORK 
PRIVACY SETTINGS 14 (2011), https://mice.cs.columbia.edu/getTechreport.php?techreportID 
=1459 (concluding that every study participant had shared unintended information). 
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promissory estoppel.179 
Websites might become discouraged from offering these features if they 
do not want to assume additional contractual obligation.  However, 
websites need not remove privacy settings altogether.  To avoid contractual 
obligation, websites should refrain from incorporating the settings into their 
terms of use and make clear that the designs, features, and icons should not 
be seen as promises by the website to protect information and should, 
therefore, be utilized accordingly.  While these disclaimers would frustrate 
the ability of users to contractually protect their information, they would 
also clarify the currently vague promises to respect users’ privacy.  
Currently, the fine print of agreements often gives a different impression 
than the overall user experience.  This is an unjust result. 
Websites might also make greater use of merger and integration clauses 
in an attempt to limit all contractual agreements to the standard-form terms 
of use.  Yet the effectiveness of the clauses might be limited because, as 
previously discussed, privacy and even privacy settings are often explicit 
and operative aspects of the terms of use.180 
Courts should look to the specific facts of a dispute to determine what 
should be inferred from code and user activity.  Ambiguous promises might 
be better informed by looking to the code in the same way that other 
“offline” ambiguous terms are informed by context.181  In many instances, 
interactivity will have no contractual effect.  Yet, courts should not ignore 
code-based features, such as privacy settings, used to earn a user’s trust 
when a website has promised to respect the privacy wishes of its users. 
Although the benefit from this proposal might be seen as incremental, it 
furthers the same interests sought to be covered by a website’s privacy 
policies.  It is not burdened with the “omnibus” dilemma whereby one 
agreement covers all information, regardless of a user’s preference 
regarding specific pieces of personal information.182  Indeed, benefits can 
be found even in modest solutions to privacy harms.  There may not be one 
solution to protecting user privacy, but to echo Professor Michael 
Froomkin, “a smorgasbord of creative technical and legal approaches could 
make a meaningful stand against what otherwise seems inevitable.”183 
                                                          
 179. See, e.g., Hartzog, supra note 73, at 891, 894.  
 180. See supra Part I.B. 
 181. See, e.g., Taylor Energy Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 734 F. Supp. 2d 112, 122 
(D.D.C. 2010) (“Plaintiff correctly argues that ‘[n]ot all disclosures are created equal; 
context matters as to whether a limited disclosure places that information in the public 
domain.’”). 
 182. See, e.g., McGeveran, supra note 103, at 1814 (arguing libertarian versus regulatory 
regimes for privacy protection presents a false dichotomy, supporting a multi-modal and 
incremental approach). 
 183. Froomkin, supra note 103, at 1466; see also Thomas, supra note 175, at 156 
(“[P]rivacy reform is best approached in small increments that avoid the paralysis 
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B. Unconscionable Design 
While some website features, such as privacy settings, help users control 
the flow of personal information, other website features might frustrate or 
confuse users or trick them into disclosing information they did not want to 
divulge.184  When considering what parties to a contract “agreed” to, courts 
should also consider whether a user’s actions were induced by a malicious 
interface.  Gregory Conti and Edward Sobiesk, leading researchers on this 
form of computer deception, define malicious interfaces simply as those 
that “deliberately violate usable design best practices in order to 
manipulate, exploit, or attack the user.”185  Malicious interfaces are the 
inverse of code-based promises.  Whereas code-based promises clarify the 
terms of disclosure regarding a user’s information, malicious interfaces 
confuse them. 
A significant motivation for designers to employ malicious interfaces is 
to gather personal information and obfuscate “legally mandated but 
undesirable information from the user.”186  Thus, these interfaces are likely 
to be involved in privacy and contract disputes.  To the extent that a 
malicious interface distorted the agreement between a website and a user, 
courts should take note of the interference and refuse to give proposed 
terms, such as user consent, legal effect. 
1. Procedural unconscionability of website design 
In essence, this Article proposes that courts extend the concept of 
procedural unconscionability beyond consent to boilerplate terms so as to 
also apply it to website design features that can affect the online agreement 
between users and websites.  The equitable doctrine of procedural 
unconscionability was popularized by the UCC but has been expanded in 
most states to non-sales contracts.187  Unconscionability is the main tool 
used by courts to reject some or all terms in standard-form contracts.188  
While “substantive unconscionability” focuses on the substance of the 
                                                          
historically associated with comprehensive reform.”). 
 184. See, e.g., In re Easysaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1172 (S.D. Cal. 
2010) (involving claims by users of an ecommerce website for, among other things, breach 
of contract and fraud because the users were allegedly “deceived into authorizing separate 
charges to their debit cards simply by typing in their e-mail address for a complimentary 
gift”). 
 185. GREGORY CONTI & EDWARD SOBIESK, MALICIOUS INTERFACE DESIGN:  EXPLOITING 
THE USER 271 (2010), available at http://www.rumint.org/gregconti/publications/201004_ 
malchi.pdf (arguing that security and human-computer interaction committees need to come 
together to fix deceptive designs). 
 186. Id. 
 187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); Russell Korobkin, Bounded 
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 
1256 (2003) (citing Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 145–48 (Ind. 1971)). 
 188. Korobkin, supra note 187, at 1256. 
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actual terms, procedural unconscionability focuses on deficiencies in the 
contract formation resulting from lack of knowledge of some or all of the 
terms, or lack of voluntariness.189  Lack of knowledge of the terms can be 
summarized as “a lack of understanding of the contract terms arising from 
inconspicuous print or the use of complex, legalistic language, . . . disparity 
in sophistication of parties, . . . and lack of opportunity to study the contract 
and inquire about contract terms.” 190  Similarly, involuntary assent to a 
contract may exist where parties have unequal bargaining power, non-
negotiable terms exist, and there is a lack of viable options for the weaker 
party.191 
As others have called for an empirically created “reasonable digital 
consumer,”192 this Article echoes the call for empirical analysis of users 
and content and proposes that it be extended to the entire user experience.  
An analysis of the entire experience is necessary because the agreement 
between a user and a website involves more than boilerplate terms, and 
thus an examination of unconscionability cannot end at the terms of use. 
With respect to privacy, this Article proposes that the significant 
presence of malicious interfaces should invalidate consent found in terms 
of use to utilize disclosed information.  Additionally, personal information 
obtained through the use of malicious interfaces should be presumed to be 
confidential if a user had an expectation of privacy according to a website’s 
terms of use or privacy policy.  For example, if Classmates.com promised 
to respect its users’ privacy settings yet made the settings intentionally 
difficult to use and changed them without notice, the website should be 
obligated to keep its promise to its users notwithstanding the consent 
obtained via confusing or modified privacy settings. 
2. A taxonomy of malicious interfaces 
Courts should consider empirical evidence of user confusion when 
confronted with a dispute involving a malicious interface.  Common 
examples of malicious interfaces include “misleading links, disabled back 
buttons, browsers with ‘sponsored’ default bookmarks, unexpected and 
unnecessary forms, blinking advertisements, and pop-ups covering desired 
content.”193  These malicious interfaces often coerce users into disclosing 
                                                          
 189. Bank of Ind., Nat’l Ass’n v. Holyfield, 476 F. Supp. 104, 109 (S.D. Miss. 1979) 
(discussing when a contract is unconscionable and finding the contract at issue 
unconscionable because it was too one-sided). 
 190. Id. at 109–10 (citations omitted). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Matwyshyn, supra note 85, at 560 (citations omitted). 
 193. Gregory Conti & Edward Sobiesk, Malicious Interfaces and Personalization’s 
Uninviting Future, IEEE SECURITY AND PRIVACY, May–June 2009, at 73, 
http://www.rumint.org/gregconti/publications/j3pri.pdf (noting that many individuals are 
tricked or coerced into divulging information they do not intend or do not want to divulge). 
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private information.194  Indeed, eleven categories of malicious design 
techniques have been identified by Conti and Sobiesk:  coercion, 
confusion, distraction, exploiting errors, forced work, interruption, 
manipulating navigation, obfuscation, restricting functionality, shock, and 
trick.195  Nearly all these categories could significantly affect the validity of 
an agreement between a website and a user. 
Several of these malicious interface techniques could invalidate the 
assent necessary to form an agreement.  For example, coercion, defined as 
“[t]hreatening or mandating the user’s compliance,”196 could require a user 
to agree to a contract before being allowed to close a screen or otherwise 
make use of a computer.  Such a tactic would leave no viable alternative to 
agreeing to the terms; thus, no voluntary assent would be present.  An 
interface could also be designed to manipulate navigation toward some 
manifestation of consent to disclosure and use of information, for example 
by leading the user to a dead end or on an infinite path,197 and the 
placement of desired content or important information deep in a navigation 
hierarchy.198  If assent to a contract or consent to collect and use personal 
information is obtained through manipulated navigation, to what degree is 
that consent voluntary? 
Confusion, defined as “[a]sking the user questions or providing 
information that they do not understand,”199 could similarly frustrate 
contract formation.200  Confusion tactics can include use of multiple 
negatives,201 such as “we promise never to refrain from ever disclosing 
your information.” 
Restricted functionality, defined as “[l]imiting or omitting controls that 
the user needs to accomplish a task,”202 could also serve to invalidate assent 
to an agreement.203  For example, while not allowing a user to proceed 
                                                          
 194. Id. 
 195. CONTI & SOBIESK, supra note 185, at 272.  A full explication of this taxonomy’s 
application to contract law is outside the scope of this Article, but will be addressed in 
future research.   
 196. Id. at 273. 
 197. See id. (listing as a representative instance “[a]sking a (near infinite) number of 
questions to get a ‘free’ iPod”). 
 198. See id. (listing as a representative instance “[m]aking the free version of an 
application far more difficult to find than the commercial version on a consumer firewall 
vendor’s website”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. (separating “Restricting Functionality” into two smaller categories—”Omit 
necessary controls” and “Hide desired interface elements”).  Conti and Sobiesk provide as 
representative instances “[r]emoval of 30 second skip button on TiVo remote control, lack 
of video download option at a video sharing site, pre-checked mailing list selections (but no 
‘unselect all’ option),” and placing the print button at an obscure location on a webpage to 
increase ad viewing times.  Id. 
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using a website without agreeing to the proposed terms would not be 
malicious—and under current doctrine would serve to form a valid 
agreement—certain features such as forcing a user to accept an agreement 
or lose certain pieces of information could invalidate consent.204 
Interfaces that obscure information or manipulate navigation have 
already been considered significant, or even dispositive, by some courts in 
analyzing electronic agreements.205  In one of the most prominent 
browsewrap cases, Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.,206 the 
Second Circuit refused to enforce terms of use where “[t]he sole reference 
to [the terms] was located in text that would have become visible to 
plaintiffs only if they had scrolled down to the next screen.”207  Thus, if 
links to terms of use are buried at the bottom of a website or anywhere 
where they are unlikely to be seen, courts have refused to find notice of 
terms sufficient to form a contract.208  The Specht decision was an excellent 
example of judicial recognition of a malicious interface, but it should be 
seen as only the beginning of the exploration regarding how website design 
can affect contract formation. 
Yet these are not the only types of malicious interfaces that can 
invalidate notice of terms.  Interfaces employing distraction and 
interruption techniques could also serve to invalidate the notice required for 
contract formation.  Distracting video, animation, blinking, color, and 
motion could attract the user’s attention away from inconspicuously 
presented terms by exploiting perception, particularly pre-attentive 
processing.209  Overly large “hot” regions for ads and other rollover design 
                                                          
 204. Id. 
 205. See In re Easysaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1172 (S.D. Cal. 2010) 
(accepting at the pleading stage of litigation as plausible that the plaintiffs “were deceived 
into authorizing separate charges to their debit cards simply by typing in their e-mail address 
for a complimentary gift”); Nordberg v. Trilegiant Corp., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088, 1098  
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (finding that the plaintiffs adequately pled claims against a rewards 
program where consumers claimed they had been automatically enrolled in a membership 
program through a pop-up advertisement, without their consent, that charged fees unless the 
consumer affirmatively canceled the program). 
 206. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 207. Id. at 23. 
 208. See, e.g., Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(holding that the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the terms of service because the website did 
not prompt her to scroll down to read them), aff’d, 380 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2010); Druyan 
v. Jagger, 508 F. Supp. 2d 228, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (enforcing terms of service when such 
terms were clearly conspicuous); Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 
425 F. Supp. 2d 756, 787 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (taking into account the license agreements were 
neither long nor buried). 
 209. CONTI & SOBIESK, supra note 185, at 273; see also Complaint at 15, FTC v. Pereira 
(E.D. Va. June 20, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/9923264/ 
990922comp9923264.shtm (alleging an unfair and deceptive trade practice by the 
defendant, which allegedly “uses technical tricks and thievery to drive consumers to 
defendant WTFRC’s sexually-explicit, adult-oriented Web sites,” which the consumer then 
has difficulty leaving because WFTRC manipulated functions of Internet browsers). 
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elements could interrupt the contract formation process or obstruct the 
presented terms. 
Malicious interfaces must be considered in context to determine their 
significance.  Much like the factors to be considered in a fair-use analysis, 
the existence of a malicious interface should not automatically invalidate a 
contract.  Rather, it should be balanced with other evidence of contract 
formation.  Clear, non-malicious interfaces should be entitled to a 
rebuttable presumption of valid consent in light of an otherwise clear 
manifestation.  However, the presence of a number of malicious interfaces 
(or a single significantly malicious interface) should receive a strong 
presumption of invalidity with regard to the disputed or operative element 
enabled through the interface. 
C. Design as Evidence of Subsequent Agreement 
When online agreements are offered as evidence in non-contractual 
privacy disputes, courts should avoid treating the text of terms of use as 
dispositive.210  Instead courts should consider the terms in conjunction with 
other evidence, such as whether the contract was enforceable and whether 
other representations were made to the user explicitly, implicitly, or by 
virtue of their relationship.211  These additional considerations could 
provide a better picture of what one court has dubbed the “operational 
reality” of the relationship between the user and the website.212 
In Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co.,213 city police department 
employees brought a number of claims, including a Fourth Amendment 
violation, against the city in connection with the department’s review of 
employees’ text messages.214  Although the employees signed a general 
“Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy,” which provided that 
“[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when 
using these resources,” the Ninth Circuit found that the “operational 
                                                          
 210. Cf. United States v. Hart, No. 08-109-C, 2009 WL 2552347, at *25 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 
17, 2009) (finding that because the defendant consented to the terms of use, “it is difficult to 
conclude that [the defendant] had an actual expectation of privacy in the contents of any 
communications sent or received with his Yahoo! accounts”). 
 211. James Grimmelmann has asserted that “when users make privacy choices using 
Facebook’s technical controls, they’re expressing expectations about who will and won’t see 
their information, and society should treat those expectations as reasonable for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.”  James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 
1197 (2009). 
 212. Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 907 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that the operational realities of a police department’s privacy policy gave police officers a 
reasonable expectation of privacy even though the written department policy specifically 
negated any expectation of privacy), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. City of Ontario v. 
Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
 213. 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 
2619 (2010). 
 214. Id. at 898. 
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reality” at the department regarding privacy in electronic messages 
reflected a different intent on the part of the police department.215  The 
employees’ superiors made it clear they would not audit messages so long 
as any additional costs for overage were paid for by the employees.216  The 
court found the employees’ reliance on this “informal policy” was 
reasonable, and as a result, the employees “had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the text messages archived in Arch Wireless’ server.”217 
Courts should adopt the strategy employed by the Ninth Circuit in Quon 
when analyzing evidence of contracts in privacy disputes.  By considering 
contextual factors such as informal policies or other representations made 
by websites, courts avoid an unjust application of contract law in situations 
where individuals reasonably relied on representations outside of the terms 
of use.  Although the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Quon,218 the justices did not significantly address the “operational 
reality” approach taken by the Ninth Circuit.  Professor Solove has 
suggested guidelines for courts when confronted with an agreement that 
could govern privacy expectations:  
(1) If the official policy clearly covers the practice at issue, and is 
specific in referencing it, then there should be a strong presumption it 
should govern.  This presumption can be overridden only when there is a 
consistent policy to the contrary demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence based on the employer’s statements and practices.  (2) If the 
official policy is general in nature, and doesn’t specifically reference the 
practice at issue, then there should be a weak presumption it should 
govern.  This presumption can be overridden when there is a 
preponderance of evidence demonstrating a different policy with regard 
to the practice at issue.219 
These guidelines could inform courts when determining the evidentiary 
value of online agreements in privacy-related disputes.  If, in the course of 
an ongoing relationship with a website, representations regarding 
confidentiality and a user’s control over the flow of information are made 
clear to the user, a user should be able to reasonably rely on them. 220 
                                                          
 215. Id. at 896. 
 216. Id. at 907. 
 217. Id. 
 218. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624 (2010); see also CX Digital Media, 
Inc. v. Smoking Everywhere, Inc., No. 09-62020-CIV, 2011 WL 1102782, at *11–12 (S.D. 
Fla. Mar. 23, 2011) (finding that an instant message exchange effectively modified a written 
agreement which contained a “no-oral modification clause”). 
 219. Daniel Solove, Thoughts on City of Ontario v. Quon:  The Fourth Amendment and 
Privacy of Electronic Communications in the Workplace, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Apr. 15, 
2010, 12:04 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/04/thoughts-on-city-
of-ontario-v-quon-the-fourth-amendment-and-privacy-of-electronic-communications.html. 
 220. This reliance justification is similar to a promissory estoppel argument and is 
related to the code-based promises proposal above.  Users might only disclose information if 
websites promise to respect a user’s privacy preferences.  See Hartzog, supra note 73, at 
HARTZOG.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2011  3:04 PM 
1670 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1635 
Some courts weighing the evidentiary value of online agreements have 
looked to user attempts to indicate privacy preferences.  Although the court 
in United States v. Hart found the terms of use dispositive regarding a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, it noted that “the evidence in the record 
does not show that the defendant sought to preserve as private that which 
the plaintiff now seeks to introduce into evidence.”221  By considering text, 
design, and action together, courts will be able to gain a better 
understanding of whether expectations of privacy are “reasonable” and 
alleviate some of the potentially unjust results from application of the ill-
fitting standard-form contract theory to privacy disputes. 
CONCLUSION 
Privacy has become central to the user experience on many websites.  
Users regularly adjust privacy settings, un-tag photos, and delete 
information on their profile page.  Privacy is also a significant aspect of the 
terms of use and privacy policies present on nearly every website.  These 
consistently vague terms often reference the website’s interactive features 
allowing users to protect their privacy.  Yet courts customarily look only to 
the fine print to determine the scope of the agreement between users and 
websites regarding privacy.  The contractual relationship formed when 
users interact with a website is far more complicated.  Website design and 
features are capable of conveying a promise of privacy and inducing user 
reliance.  The fine print in terms of use agreements and privacy policies 
often incorporates user privacy and website design.  When website design 
is part of, or consistent with, the terms of use and central to the user 
experience, courts should look beyond boilerplate terms to find additional 
promises, acceptances of offers, and even elements that can interfere with 
contract formation. 
Often, websites give the impression that website features, like the ability 
to increase privacy settings, are offers to protect information.  Websites 
often promise to respect a user’s privacy choices and in the same paragraph 
reference their privacy settings.  In those contexts, courts should consider 
user preferences for privacy as acceptances of offers of confidentiality. 
Courts should also more thoroughly scrutinize the ways in which website 
design can frustrate true agreement between the parties.  Specifically, 
courts should refuse to enforce agreements where websites have 
egregiously employed malicious interfaces in the contract formation 
process.  Courts should extend the concept of procedural unconscionability 
                                                          
924. 
 221. United States v. Hart, No. 08-109-C, 2009 WL 2552347, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 17, 
2009) (citation omitted).  
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beyond the terms of use and consider the presence of malicious interfaces 
in website features on the agreement regarding user privacy.  Features such 
as misleading links, disabled back buttons, unnecessary and confusing 
forms, and pop-ups covering desired content could all frustrate contract 
formation.  
Finally, in non-contractual disputes where terms are merely evidence of 
consent, courts should look beyond the fine print to discover the 
operational reality between the parties.  Here, courts should consider the 
relationship between the parties, other representations made by the website, 
and the context in which information was disclosed.  For example, courts 
could consider whether information was deleted before a privacy harm 
occurred, whether privacy settings were utilized, or whether there were any 
other operational realities outside of the terms of use that induced reliance 
on a promise of confidentiality. 
Online agreements are a promising solution to protect the flow of 
personal information only if courts look beyond the language included in 
standard-form contracts.  Greater recognition of website design as a 
contract would advance both contract and privacy doctrine by better 
reflecting perceived promises of privacy and what information individuals 
desire to keep confidential.  Empowering users with simple and precise 
ways to contractually protect their personal information could make the 
overwhelming number of online agreements part of a trusted system of 
Internet communication. 
 
